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Taxes and fees of regional water authorities in the Netherlandsi 
Authors: Herman Vollebergh and Justin Dijk (PBL) 
Brief summary of the case 
The Dutch water management system is fairly unique in the world due to the comprehensive 
water quantity regulation through dykes and artificial waterways and its linkage with water 
quality regulation. The existing levy system is based on principles of cost recovery and ‘stake-
pay-say’ (i.e. strong stakeholder participation and more influence for those who pay levies). 
The peculiarities of the levy base clearly had a strong impact on businesses’ behaviour in the 
past, investing in their own water treatment plants to avoid payment of levies. Moreover, the 
levy also seems to have contributed to innovation in the waste water treatment sector. 
Although the Dutch water levy system seems to be working quite well, as identified in a 2014 
OECD report there remain opportunities for further improvement and an evaluation of the 
system is currently underway.  
 
1 Description of the design, scope and effectiveness of the instrument  
1.1 Design of the instrument  
Water management in a delta like the Netherlands is a complex undertaking, due to its low-
lying geographical position, the high density and variety of waterways, the high population 
density, and the intensive use of land (OECD, 2014a,b). An elaborate financing structure has 
been established to fund water management in this setting. The benefits of these water 
management functions accrue to a variety of users. For example, several user groups – such 
as households, farmers, industry and businesses – benefit from flood risk management, as 
more than 30% of the country is below sea level (van der Veeren and Keijser, 2011), and 65% 
of Dutch GDP is earned in areas that need to be protected against flooding by rivers or the 
sea (Delta Committee, 2011).  
 
The agencies involved in water resources management in the Netherlands finance their 
budgets in different ways. Guidance is provided by the ‘user pays’ or the ‘polluter pays’ 
principles. An objective of most water-related levies is ensuring full cost recovery. The most 
important levies and fees related to water use and pollution are delegated to the so-called 
Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) (see section 1.2). The taxation of water consists of several 
different instruments and the RWAs are 95% funded through their own levies. In 2009, the 
RWAs put in place a new tax system that removed separate levies for the maintenance of 
water barriers, water quantity management, waterways, road management and water 
quality.  Three different levies currently apply1 (see also OECD, 2014a,b):  
 
(i) A water systems levy (Dutch: watersysteemheffing) to cover the costs of ‘dry feet’ 
(including flood protection measures) and to provide sufficient and clean surface 
water2. This is charged to building and home owners (‘built’ or ‘property owners’ 
                                                     
1 Note that the variation in rates across regions is large. Table 2 below offers an average household bill for all 
three levies (and the average payment for drinking water).  
2 A levy to cover the cost of dry feet already existed in the Middle Ages. 
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pay about 49%), households3 (‘residents’ or ‘households’ covers about 39%), and 
owners of ‘not-built’ land for agriculture (the category ‘not built’ or ‘owners of 
cultivated land’) and nature conservation (together cover about 11%);  
 
(ii) A waste water treatment levy (Dutch: zuiveringsheffing) related to the cost of 
waste water treatment.4 This depends on the amount of pollution that households 
or businesses discharge into the sewage system, but households and small firms 
face a fixed fee (‘forfait’). The levy is based on a ‘pollution unit’ equal to the 
average amount of waste substances discharged per year per entity. In 2012, the 
average levy was EUR 53.51 per pollution unit and the ratio of tax revenues of 
businesses to households was 26% to 74%; and 
 
(iii) A pollution levy (Dutch: verontreinigingsheffing) for direct discharges to surface 
waters, originally introduced in 1970. The levy is charged depending on the 
amount of pollution that households or businesses discharge into surface waters.5  
 
In addition to these levies raised by RWAs, the central Government contributes to the RWAs’ 
finances by paying construction and maintenance costs of water barriers and the main 
waterways. In addition to the waste water treatment levy at the water board level, owners of 
residential and business properties also pay a sewage levy (Dutch: rioolheffing) for their 
connection to the sewage network at the municipal level. The overall cost of all water use in 
the Netherlands (including the cost of producing drinking water, sewerage treatment, etc.) is 
estimated to be about 1.26% of GDP (OECD 2014a,b). The overall cost of RWAs is about EUR 
2.6 billion each year, i.e. around one third of this overall cost. Note also that water 
management and its financial regulation is a highly decentralised system where the central 
Government only plays a minor role.  
 
The system with three different levies was introduced in 2009. Until 2008, the waste water 
treatment function and the clean surface water function were financed by the water pollution 
levy. The cost of water protection and maintenance of waterways were financed by a water 
quantity levy. Therefore the major change is that cost recovery of waste water treatment is 
now dealt with separately from a pollution levy on the remaining discharges in the water 
system.  
1.2 Drivers and barriers of the instrument 
In 2014 there were 23 Dutch RWAs or ‘water boards’ (Dutch: waterschappen). The RWAs are 
responsible for the management and maintenance of water barriers and waterways, 
maintenance of water level in polders and maintenance of surface water quality through 
wastewater treatment. They are not responsible for water supply to the general public (OECD 
2014a,b). The RWAs have their own governing bodies, tax areas and legal powers, which are 
                                                     
3 The water system levy for households is on average EUR 69 and varies between EUR 32 and EUR 120 between 
RWA regions (Coelo 2012).  
4 The waste water treatment levy varies from below EUR 125 to over EUR 255 across the RWA districts (see 
Coelo 2012). 
5 Five water boards also collect a road levy (Dutch: wegenheffing) that is earmarked for regional road 
maintenance. There also exists a national pollution levy for direct discharges to waterways that do not fall under 
the jurisdiction of the water boards (the so-called Rijkswateren). 
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derived from the 1992 Regional Water Authorities Act which was substantially amended in 
20076 (‘Wet modernisering waterschapsbestel‘), the Water Act (2009) and the authorities’ 
own by-laws (Havekes et al., 2015).7 Note also the leading principle applied in this field of 
‘stake-pay-say’ (i.e. strong stakeholder participation and more influence for those who pay 
levies).  
 
At the end of the 1960s, environmental awareness grew strongly and environmental policies 
mainly targeted waste and water pollution. Decentralised environmental levies, fees and 
charges were introduced to finance local abatement policies according to the ‘polluter pays 
principle’. These policies were implemented by both municipalities and the RWAs. As a 
consequence these charges and fees were set up so that households and firms alike would 
contribute.  
 
In the recent past, the Netherlands has seen an increasing variety of local arrangements in 
the wastewater chain and the adoption of successive plans as country-wide instruments for 
strategic planning to deal with ‘too much – too little – too polluted water’. Other important 
reforms have included the ‘modernisation’ in 2006 of the Rijkswaterstaat (the National Water 
Authority and the executive agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment), 
and the consolidation of the water-related legal framework in 2009, with eight water laws 
combined into the National Water Act. Further cross-sectoral integration between spatial 
planning, nature conservation and water policy at the national level is being contemplated in 
the Environmental Planning Act framework, which is currently under preparation and 
expected to be adopted by 2018 (OECD 2014a,b). 
1.3 Revenue collection and use 
In addition to the central Government, three other governmental bodies are permitted to 
levy taxes in the Netherlands, i.e. the provincial, municipal, and regional water authorities. 
The provincial authorities impose a number of environmental taxes, but only one levy on 
groundwater which generates EUR 15 million per year. The sewage levy is applied by 
municipalities. In 2012, about 91% of the total tax burden originated from national taxes, the 
remaining taxes can be attributed to the provinces (1%), municipalities (6%) and the RWAs 
(2%) (UVW, 2015). Table 1 shows the overall revenue collected by the RWAs and the revenue 
per levy since the new levy system was applied in 2009. Overall revenue has risen in nominal 
terms from EUR 2,173 million in 2009 to EUR 2,692 million in 2016, i.e. a substantial rise of 
24% in seven years. Among other reasons, this increase accounts for RWAs’ yearly 
contribution of EUR 181 million to a national flood protection program 
(‘Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma’) and RWAs’ responsibility for muskrat control 
measures since 2011.  
  
                                                     
6 Its fiscal paragraph was amended in January 2009. 
7 The Water Act is aimed at simplifying the implementation of European water rights (particularly the Water 
Framework Directive and the Directive on the Assessment and Management of Flood Risks). The Water Act 
contains almost all the laws relating to water. The institute of the regional water authority is, however regulated 
in the RWA Act, the (municipal) sewerage management in the Environmental Management Act, and the drinking 
water supplies in the Drinking Water Act (Havekes et al. 2015). 
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Table 1 RWAs, overall revenue and revenue for each levy (in EUR million) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 
Total levies 2,173 2,262 2,343 2,426 2,504 2,575 2,643 2,692 
Water system levy 999 1,059 1,104 1,158 1,223 1,279 1,344 1,377 
Levy road maintenance  35 37 37 38 35 35 36 36 
Other  29 22 17 17 16 11   
Waste water treatment 
levy 1,097 1,134 1,176 1,204 1,221 1,241 1,255 1,270 
Pollution levy 12 10 9 10 9 9 9 9 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2016a)  
* Estimated figures for 2016. 
 
As noted before, the waste water treatment levy, the water systems levy, and the pollution 
levy are all earmarked taxes that provide the RWAs with sufficient funds for necessary 
investments and maintenance. Since direct discharges to surface waters rarely occur these 
days, the annual revenue from the pollution levy is only about EUR 10 million. The waste 
water treatment levy and the water systems levy are responsible for an annual revenue of 
EUR 1.3 and EUR 1.2 billion respectively. In 2012, the administrative costs of raising these 
taxes fell to EUR 4.50 for every EUR 100 collected (from EUR 6.30 in 2005) (Dekking and 
Havekes, 2014).8  
 
The levies are applied to both consumers and other ‘property owners’ like firms and farmers. 
Because the distribution of the water quantity levy from before 2008 was different from the 
water pollution levy, the new system caused some tax shifts in the distribution between firms 
and households. For instance, citizens living in areas without flood protection would 
sometimes not pay for flood protection under the old system, but had to pay the full water 
systems levy from 2009 onwards. On average, the new tax system resulted in a higher tax 
burden for households, and lower taxes for firms (agriculture in particular) and owners of 
conservation areas; a tax shift of approximately EUR 79 million from (agricultural) firms and 
(conservation) land owners to households (van den Berg et al., 2009). 
1.4 Environmental impacts and effectiveness  
Both Dutch water and waste charges have often been praised for their effectiveness and even 
the inducement of technological change (e.g. Opschoor and Vos, 1989). Less attention has 
been paid, however, to the important design elements that have contributed to this success 
as explained above. The water pollution levy was a typical emission tax from its conception, 
i.e. its tax base was directly related to a ‘weighted’ pollution index.9 This analysis focuses on 
the impact and effectiveness of the old pollution levy, i.e. the levy that was in force before 
2009 and which was also used to finance waste water treatment.  
 
                                                     
8 This substantial reduction in cost is due to cooperation between RWAs and municipalities in the collection of 
levies and local taxes. 
9 The population equivalent (PEQ) in waste water treatment expresses the ratio of the sum of the pollution load 
produced during 24 hours by industrial facilities and services to the pollution load in household sewage produced 
by one person in the same time period. For practical calculations, it is assumed that one unit equals 54 grams of 
biochemical oxygen demand per 24 hours. 
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Figure 1 shows some key correlations of the Dutch water pollution tax. Interestingly, the initial 
application and substantial rise of the levy (right axis) seems to have contributed to a sharp 
decline in overall emissions until about the year 2000 (left axis). One of the main reasons has 
been the clear shift from emissions directly discharged to open water towards water 
treatment plants, which has increased from 13 million population equivalents (PEQ) to 22 
million PEQ treated by purification plants. This enormous shift is mainly related to changing 
behavior of firms, who have increasingly invested in their own water treatment plants to 
avoid paying levies. 
 
Figure 1 Cost, production and treatment of waste water in the Netherlands 1975-2008 
 
Note: Waste water produced and treated in million population equivalents (left axis); revenue in EUR million at 
2013 prices (right axis). 
Source: EDC (2011) 
A final indicator of the effectiveness of this earmarked tax is provided by Figure 2. This shows 
the percentage of some of the most important pollutants (nitrogen, phosphorus and 
suspended particulate matter) removed by waste water treatment in the Netherlands from 
1981-2014. For instance, in 1981 untreated sewage had a nitrogen concentration of 53 mg/l 
and a concentration of 25 mg/l after treatment – a removal rate of 53%. For all three 
categories, the removal rates have improved significantly – the removal rate of nitrogen was 
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Figure 2 Removal rate for key pollutants in waste water treatment 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2016b)  
1.5 Other impacts 
Employment data over time are difficult to obtain in the Netherlands (due to several changes 
in measurement in the last 15 years). In total 4,000 people are employed for waste water 
treatment in 2012 (EDC, 2014). However, this figure does not include employment for other 
purposes, like dyke maintenance or the RWAs themselves. It is estimated that about 11,000 
people are employed by the RWAs. 
 
One measure of a potential innovation impact is the number of patents in water and waste 
water management. In the Netherlands 273 patents were filed in the period 1977-2010 which 
is 5.6% of the overall number of patents in this category in the EU. This is a substantial number 
(the Netherlands ranks 5th behind Germany, France, UK and Italy). Currently the waste water 
treatment plants are active in new purification technologies, like the well-known Nereda 
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Figure 3 Revenue water pollution levy and patents in (waste) water management 
 
Source: OECD iLibrary and OECD Regpat database 
 
It is not easy to assess distributional consequences due to the complex way in which the levies 
are imposed and the enormous variation across regions of the Netherlands. As mentioned 
above, the wastewater levy varies from below EUR 125 to over EUR 255 across the RWA 
districts (see Coelo 2012). This variation is also related to differences in regional cost and 
prevents the need for cross-subsidisation between the regions. The OECD (2014b) calculated 
the average household water bill in 2012 (see Table 2). Based on these figures, the average 
water bill for households amounts to EUR 533, or EUR 464, if the costs of water management 
are not factored in. This suggests that the water bill in the Netherlands is similar to countries 
that recover costs from revenues through water bills (e.g. Belgium-Wallonia and Flanders, 
England and Wales, France, Sweden, Switzerland).  
 
Table 2 Average household water bill in 2012 























































2 Stakeholder engagement 
The OECD has shown how many levels of government and stakeholders are involved in water 
management in the Netherlands (see Figure 4). This is hardly surprising because water is a 
key resource. Several important principles guide the financing of water resources 
management in the Netherlands, i.e. the ‘user pays’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles, and ‘stake, 
pay, say’. These principles also guide who is involved in which aspect of the overall planning 
process, i.e. in the definition of goals and implementation through instruments.  
 
Figure 4 Institutional mapping  
 
Source: OECD (2014b) 
 
Unsurprisingly, there is often disagreement on who should contribute how much to what in 
relation to cost recovery through the levies. Key players are households, ‘property owners’, 
agriculture and different government levels (municipalities, RWAs, provinces and central 
government including the National Water Authority (Rijkswaterstaat, which is the agency 
responsible for water management). Other stakeholders are drinking water companies, the 
Delta Commissioner and many advisory institutes. The presence of NGOs is rather limited in 
the country’s national water policy but more orientated towards specific projects, and very 
active towards international cooperation and developing countries. 
 
As noted before the Dutch water levy system was fundamentally reformed in 2009 (see Figure 
5). Interestingly, a 2014 OECD (2014b) report opened a new window of opportunity for reform 
and has led to a process to evaluate the current levy system. One of the issues is the major 
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shift in the distribution of cost towards households. Another issue is that there is currently, 
aside from the existing manure policy, no specific policy to address diffuse sources of the 
agricultural sector as a ‘polluter’ of water, and hence as a ‘payer’ for losses in terms of 
decreased biodiversity, recreational values, scenic beauty and other water quality-related 
values. This observation, however, is also highly disputed by some stakeholders. 
 
Figure 5 Timeline of Key Developments in Dutch water levies 
 
 
This new window of opportunity has been exploited by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment and led to the installation of a new tax commission (in Dutch Commissie 
Aanpassing Belastingstelsel, CAB). Representation within this Commission is mainly restricted 
to managers from within the water sector. However, the Commission has created several 
opportunities to involve many internal and external stakeholders in its evaluation process, 
including firm representatives, farmers and NGOs. This process will be linked to a broader 
evaluation of long term financing issues of sustainable water use in the Netherlands.  
 
3 Windows of opportunity  
 
Figure 6 summarises the role of civil society in the processes of policy formulation, decision 
making, policy implementation, monitoring and the evaluation of the Dutch water levies. In 
all of these processes there are windows of opportunity for stakeholders to be involved. Policy 
formulation is based on the ‘stake-pay-say’ principle: those who have a stake in the duties 
performed by the RWA should in principle bear the costs and be represented in the governing 
bodies of the RWAs. Furthermore, binding decisions and regulation that affects the citizens 
of a RWA’s region generally do not come about without participation procedures (as is 
stipulated in Article 79 of the RWA Act). Furthermore, Article 12 of the RWA Act ensures that 
an exhaustive list of stakeholders must be represented in the board of a RWA. Hence, 
residents, farmers, owners of nature areas and businesses are all represented in decision 
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making. Policy implementation is performed by an executive committee consisting of a 
chairperson and approx. four members that are appointed by the board. All proposals, such 
as the implementation of laws and bye-laws, and the granting of permits and exemptions that 
are put forward by the board, are prepared by the executive committee. Note that the 
executive committee is also charged with the enforcement of laws and bye-laws (Havekes et 
al. 2015). The OECD (2014b) report evaluated the Dutch water governance system and made 
several recommendations. As noted above, a new tax commission (CAB) is currently 
evaluating the Dutch system in response to the OECD evaluation and will present its final 
report in 2017. 
 




4 Insights into future potential/reform  
4.1 Actual Planned reforms and stakeholder engagement 
See Section 2. 
4.2 Suggestions for future reforms – instrument design and civil society engagement  
The Dutch water levy system based on its cost recovery principle seems to be working quite 
well. This is echoed in the conclusion of the OECD (2014b) report. This report, however, also 
concludes that ‘an agenda for water policy reform in the Netherlands should explore cost-
efficient, adaptive and place-based responses, which minimise path dependency and improve 
economic incentives to manage “too much”, “too little” or “too polluted” water’. The 
suggestion for a renewed focus on governance, with an emphasis on active stakeholder 
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involvement, as well as more transparent information and performance monitoring, seems 
to be applied already in the current levy reform process (see discussion on CAB in Section 2).  
 
However, the OECD (2014b) also concluded that the ‘economic incentives to efficiently 
manage “too much”, “too little” and “too polluted” water could be strengthened’. Those who 
benefit from spatial development, such as municipalities and property developers, do not 
necessarily bear the additional costs those developments impose on water management, for 
instance. With regards to water pollution, the OECD (2014b) concludes that the current levy 
system is insufficiently linked to the economic incentives to exploit the numerous technical 
measures in place to reduce sources of pollution. Also the strong distributional impacts of the 
reform in 2009 still deserve attention in view of the projected rise in the future cost of 
maintaining both water quantity and quality objectives. 
4.3 Suggestions for replicability 
Some aspects of the Dutch situation are fairly unique, such as the comprehensive water 
quantity regulation through dykes and artificial waterways. However, the design of the cost 
recovery levy provides fairly good prospects for replicability. Apparently, the specifics of the 
levy base has clearly had a strong impact on businesses’ behaviour in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, the levy also seems to have contributed positively to innovation in the drinking 
water sector. The ‘stake-pay-say’ principle and approach to strong stakeholder engagement 
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